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 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are supreme ruler and demoralization 
wireless scheme. MANETs are infrastructure less i.e. their structure is not 
fixed, and the nodes be able to move about and can leave the network 
whenever they want. The nodes are to perform as more over router and host. 
In MANETs, the node can be in contact with every node as their 
configuration is not fixed and the nodes starts transmitting the packets to 
each other for the establishment of the connection. To hitch the link, the 
nodes make use of some routing protocols like Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), and Destination-
Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV). Security in MANET is the key matter 
meant for the fundamental utility of network. There are many attacks caused 
in MANET. Blackhole attack is one that occurs in MANET. A Black hole 
attack is an attack where the node, which is malicious advertise itself as 
having the optimal route to the destination and drops all the packets instead 
of forwarding further to the destination. Here, we have shown the blackhole 
attack in AODV and DSR. Through simulation we evaluate the performance 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are independent and deconcentrate systems or wireless 
systems. In the network system, MANETs always comprises of the mobile nodes which may be structures or 
subsystems, acting as a router as well as host. In the network, depending on each other's connection they can 
form different network configuration or topography by their self-arrangement power, without any fixed 
infrastructure. Routing protocols are the most fascinating, ambitious and challenging areas in MANET 
research. Many routing protocols that have been designed for MANETS such as AODV, DSR, DSDV, OLSR 
etc. The very intensive worry for the basic functionality in MANET is routing security. Due to the 
characteristics like open access medium, dynamically altering topology, deficiency of central management 
and monitoring systems, cooperative algorithms and deficiency of transparent defense mechanism of 
MANETs often ill used by attackers and endure security attacks. The network services accessibility, data 
integrity and confidentiality can be gained by safeguarding the security problems that have been detected 
within the network. Moreover, the wireless connection makes MANETs to be more susceptible to the attacks 
by providing access to on-going communications. Varieties of attacks are found out in the MANETs and 
classified as; wormhole attack, blackhole attack, sybil attack, flooding attack, routing table overflow attack, 
Denial of Service (DoS), impersonation attack etc.  
Antecedently, many more works are performed on issues of security. One of the attack is Black 
Hole Attack. Blackhole Attack deeply related to reactive routing protocols in MANET like AODV and DSR. 
In our work we condense or concentrate our study on the two routing protocols AODV and DSR. We have 
analyzed the effect of Blackhole attack on the AODV and DSR routing protocol through a simulation carried 
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out using NS-2. Its consequences are explained by expressing how this attack interrupt the execution of 
MANET routing protocols. 
In chapter 2 we presented a study of routing protocols emphasizing on AODV protocol and DSR 
protocol in detail. In chapter 3 we discussed about the blackhole attack in MANETs in details. In chapter 4 
we discussed how black hole attack makes the protocols to misbehave and also described how the new 
protocols supporting attacks are implemented in NS-2.35. Chapter 5 discusses the performance metrics, 
analysis and comparison of blackhole attack in AODV and DSR and Finally in Chapter 6 we discussed about 
future research directions and concluded our work. 
 
 
2. DIFFERENT MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
According to MANETs operational functionalities, the routing protocols [1-2] are divided into three 
categories such as reactive routing protocols, proactive routing protocols and hybrid routing protocols. The 





Figure 1. Manet routing protocol classification 
 
 
2.1. Reactive protocols  
Reactive protocols are well recognized as on demand protocols. They are known as such on-demand 
protocols because of the concept that they never begin route discovery process by themselves, until they are 
asked for it i.e these types of protocols are framed up the routes when demanded [3]. When a source node 
needs to start a conversation with another node within the network and having no route to that node, then it 
requests for a route to establish and a route discovery process is initiated by the protocol on demand. 
Reactive routing protocols use the flooding mechanism to spread the route request message during route 
discovery. No bandwidth is consumed for sending the routing information whereas bandwidth is consumed 
during the transfer of data by node. 
 
2.1.1.    AODV 
2.1.1.1. Basics 
AODV is explained in RFC 3561 [4]. As it is a reactive routing protocol, when it possesses no route 
information and a source node is desires to begin the communication to any other node within the mobile 
network then AODV uses the mechanism of flooding control messages for finding a route to the required 
node within the network. In AODV, the source routing option is not used. When the sender node wants to 
transmit the packet, it examines its routing table and looking forward for the next intermediate hop to the 
destination then sends the packet and so on. Control messages in AODV broadly classified into three types as 
explained below: 
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a. Route Request Message (RREQ): Initially when no path is available from a source node to destination 
node, then the source node floods the network with RREQs messages using expandable ring technique. 
Each RREQ message header maintains a time to live (TTL) field that implements the expandable ring by 
limiting on the number hops that the RREQ should be transferred. RREQ ID is a field in RREQ message 
which is used for unique identification of the RREQ packets in conjunction with source IP address. 
RREQ message also contains other fields like destination IP address, sequence numbers of source and 
destination along with the various control flags. The sequence number represents the freshness of the 
RREQ messages and the hop count represents the number of traversed nodes originating from source to 
the destination. Each intermediate node when receives a RREQ message, it increments the hop count 
field value by one and rebroadcasts the packet again for a fresher route to the destination. 
b. Route Reply Message (RREP): On receiving a RREQ, any intermediate node that have a fresher route to 
the destination node or the destination node itself initiates a RREP and unicasts towards the source node 
or the originator of the RREQ. Each RREP packet contains different fields like IP address of source and 
destination, destination sequence number, route life time and the hop count along with the various 
control flags. When a RREP reaches an intermediate node, its hop count field value is incremented and 
re-forwarded towards the originating node following of the path established by the selected RREQ in 
reverse. This process is repeated until the RREP arrives the originating node and the route is established. 
c. Route Error Message (RERR): During the active routes, link status is observed by every node in the 
network to its intermediate nodes. Whenever a broken link is found out in an active route by any node, 
then it initiates a RERR message and forwards to its neighbor nodes in order to make the notification to 
the other nodes that the link is being braked or down. 
 
2.1.1.2. Route Discovery Mechanism in AODV 
Considering a source node S which wants to communicate with the destination node D will generate 
a RREQ and broadcasts it to the neighbor nodes A and C. The nodes A and C on receiving the RREQS 
forward them to their neighbor nodes B and E respectively. This process is repeated until destination node D 
is reached. Locating any intermediate node that have a fresher route to the destination node or the destination 
node D a RREP is initiated and forwarded to the originating node S. RREPs arriving the source node 
following the reverse path traveled by the RREQs establishes a route between the source node “S'' and 
destination node “D”. After the route establishment between “S” and “D”, communication can take place in 
between them. Figure 2 shows the interchange of RREQ and RREP messages during route discovery between 





Figure 2. RREQ and RREP interchange during route discovery between source and destination node 
 
 
2.1.1.3. Routing Maintenance 
During a link failure in the path established between the source and destinations for communication, 
a RRER message is initiated and sent to the source informing about the down or broken link. From source 
broadcasting a RREQ message towards the destination node i.e. in Figure 3 from source “S” to destination 
“D”, at node “F” a broken link is encountered between “F'' and “D”, so getting this link to be down a RERR 
message is initiated at node “F” and sent to the source node “S” making it aware about the link breakage. 
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The main advantage of this AODV protocol is that it is obtaining the routes that is being found on 
demand and that the current route towards the destination is determined using the destination sequence 
numbers which lowers the delay for the communication set-up. 
 
2.1.1.5. Disadvantage 
 In AODV protocol discrepant routes may result at intermediate nodes due to the absence of fresh 
entries in the routing table, which means unavailability of current destination sequence number in presence of 
a very older source sequence number, may result in discrepant routes. If multiple RREPs are generated for a 
single RREQ packet, then this can residue to heavy control overhead. 
 
2.1.2. DSR 
a. Basics: DSR [5] is a reactive routing protocol in which route cache is updated with new routes obtained 
from the source to the destination node. For a node route is specified on-demand or when needed by a 
node for transmission of data. The processes during routing are Route Discovery Process and Route 
Maintenance Process which are discussed below. 
b. Route Discovery Process: Routing cache is checked by a source node before transmission of data to 
another node and if no information is available about route to the destination or it is expired then a 
RREQ is broadcasted by the node and the process of broadcasting is repeated unless the RREQ reaches 
the destination node. Reaching the destination node, a RREP is generated and sent in reverse path to the 
source node [6] and receiving the RREP, its cache is updated with the new route information received. 
Further the entire traffic is routed through that newly created route. 
c. Route Maintenance Process: During transmission if a node fails to find a next hop with the source data 
or route, then a RERR is initiated and sent to the source node making it aware about the route failure, 
and if it happens then the source node re-conducts the route discovery process. 
 
2.2. Proactive protocols 
Proactive routing protocols perform in a different way in comparison to reactive routing protocols. 
These protocols are table driven in nature [7] and each node maintains the routing information of the whole 
network. Any change in the network topology is reflected in the routing information table contained by each 
node and hence knows about the other nodes in progress. The routing information is constructed at nodes by 
exchange of connectivity information using HELLO messages and neighborhood information using TC 
messages. Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [8] is one of the example of proactive routing protocol. 
 
2.3. Hybrid Protocols 
In different Scenarios, reactive and proactive routing protocols work their best. A mix of both the 
protocols, named as hybrid routing protocol propose to make the use of proactive routing in some areas and 
reactive routing for the rest of network. The entire network is partitioned into small domains called zone and 
proactive routing is used within each zone decreasing the control overheads and delays using the information 
available in routing table. Reactive routing is used to route packets between different zones due to its 
efficiency with bandwidth in constantly changing network. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [9] is one of the 
example of hybrid routing protocol. 
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3. BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN MANET 
In black hole attack attacker nodes exploit the vulnerability in route discovery process of on-demand 
protocols and inject false route to the destination. On receiving a RRER message intermediate attacker node 
sends a RREP with a higher destination sequence number than the RREQ message received claiming to the 
destination. When an attacker chooses the concept of rushing along with high power transmission to make 
this attack. It is quite impossible to find out a route not passing through the attacker node. Once the node 
chosen as an intermediate node or becoming part of routes in the network starts misusing or discarding the 
traffic being routed through it creating a black hole. This attack can be severe when the attacker becomes the 
part of more number of routes. 
 
3.1. Types of Blackhole Attack 
Basically, black hole attack can be categorized into two types as: 
a. Single Blackhole Attack   
b. Cooperative Blackhole Attack 
 
3.1.1. Single Blackhole Attack 
In single black hole attack, a particular attacker node advertises itself for having fresh routes to 
destination node following the shortest path and it helps the attacker node to reply all the RREQs being the 
part of route, further during data transfer intercepts the data packets and retaining it [10]. In reactive routing 
protocols that uses flooding mechanism a mischievous and forged route is created as the attacker nodes 
RREP is received before the legitimate ones. Being the part of route, the attacker node behaves to drop all the 
packets received or to send it for an arbitrary address [11]. Overall, we can say that to make a black hole 
attack the attacker node becomes the part of the route but how it is not specified as it differs from protocol to 
protocol. In Figure 4 and 5source node “S” want send data to destination node “D” and hence, a route 
discovery process is initiated by the protocol from “S” to “D” and “A”, ”B”,”C”,”E” are the intermediate 
nodes. Considering “B” as an attacker node and claims to have active routes to the destination “D”, on 
receiving RREQ packets “B” sends a RREP to “S” before other legitimate nodes making “S” to believe that 
“B” is a legitimate node and can be a part of the active route. Hence all other RREPs from legitimate nodes 
are discarded by “S” and making the route discovery come to an end. Onwards “S” sends the data packets 





Figure 4. Single blackhole attack 
 
 
3.1.2. Cooperative Blackhole Attack 
Cooperative black hole attack signifies that the attackers acts in a group. In Figure 5, “S” is the 
source node and “D” is the destination node, nodes “A”, “B1”, “B2”, “C”, “E”, “F” are the intermediate 
nodes. Considering “B1” and “B2” be the cooperative Black hole nodes, when “S” want to send a data packet 
“D”, a route discovery is initiated by sending RREQ packets to the neighboring nodes. The attacker nodes 
being part of the network, also accept the RREQ and send the RREP to “S” immediately. The RREP from 
“B1” reaches first at “S” before any other nodes RREP. Hence source ode “S” starts sending packets to “B1” 
assuming it to be legitimate node. Attacker node “B1” instead of forwarding the data packets, drops them or 
transmitted to the other attacker node “B2”. Further “B2” drops all the packet instead of forwarding it to 
towards destination. 
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Figure 5. Cooperative blackhole attack 
 
 
According to [12], in the Figure 6 when the “S” sends a ``Further Request (FRq)'' to “B2” through a 
different routing path (S-A-B2) other than the routing path through “B1” and asks “B2” for having any 
routing path to “B1” and “D”. As “B2” is working in cooperation with “B1”, its “Further Reply (FRp)” will 
be “yes” to both the questions. Hence as suggested in [13], node S starts passing the data packets considering 
the route (S-B1-B2) is secure. However, in actuality, the packets are dropped by node “B1” or “B2” 





Figure 6. Cooperative blackhole attack 
 
 
3.2. Blackhole Attack in AODV and DSR 
Considering AODV and DSR, black hole attacks can be classified into two categories according to 
the presence of attacker nodes. They are:  
a. Internal Blackhole Attack   
b. External Blackhole Attack 
 
3.2.1. Internal Black Hole Attack  
In this type of black hole attack an internal compromised node exists between the source and 
destination nodes. It becomes the part of an active route and conducts the attack. Internal black hole attacks 
are named so as the attacker node by self belongs to the data route. This type of attacks is more endangered to 
guard against as it is so difficult to detect the internal compromised nodes.  
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Figure 7. External blackhole attack 
 
 
3.2.2. External Black Hole Attack 
In external blackhole attacks attackers stay outside of the current network and deny access to 
network traffic or disrupting the network or creating congestions as shown in Figure 7. Further the external 
blackhole attacks may lead to internal blackhole attack by compromising some of the internal legitimate 
nodes involving them in attacking other nodes in MANET. 
 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN AODV AND DSR USING NS-2.35  
In our case, we use ns-2.35 for the simulation of the blackhole attack in AODV and DSR, and also 
to compare the performance metrics of both routing protocols AODV and DSR in presence of blackhole 
attack.  
 
4.1. Blackhole Attack in AODV 
The attacker node should be able to participate in the AODV messaging for this the new protocol 
which exhibits blackhole attack. AODV protocol is modified by adding the lines in Figure 8 to aodv.cc and 
the lines in Figure 9 to aodv.h to exhibit blackhole behavior. After adding the lines, the new routing protocol 




Figure 8. Lines added to aodv.cce 
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4.2. Blackhole Attack in DSR 
The attacker node should be able to participate in the DSR messaging for this the new constructed 
protocol which exhibits blackhole attack. DSR protocol is modified by adding the lines in Figure 12 to the 
dsragent.cc and lines in Figure 13 to dsragent.h for the blackhole behavior. Then the new routing protocol of 





Figure 11. Implemented blackhole attack scenario in DSR 
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Figure 12. Lines added to dsr.cc 
 
Figure 13. Lines added to dsr.h 
 
 
5.  PERFORMANCE METRICES OF BLACKHOLE ATTACK 
Here, in this section performance metric of the blackhole attack in AODV and DSR is compared and 
analyzed, which of the routing protocol is better in presence blackhole attack. This is being shown in the 
Figures 14 to 16 
 
5.1. End-to-end Delay 
End-to-end delay is the time taken by a packet to get transmitted from the source node to destination 
node successfully including the hop delays, transmission delays and queue delays. Performance of a network 





Figure 14. Comparison of End-to-end delay in blackhole attack of AODV and DSR 
 
 
5.2. Packet Delivery Ratio 
Packet Delivery Ratio is the ratio of the total number of data packets received at the destination with 
respect to the total number of packets sent by the source. Performance of a network increases with the 
increase in packet delivery ratio values. 
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Throughput is the number of packets moved successfully from source to destination in a given time 









MANETs require no fixed infrastructure and can be easily deployed in hostile situations where the 
implementation of a traditional network is not so easy. Hence MANETs are broadly used nowadays in the 
field of communications. Due to MANETs properties and importance, there are many more challenges to 
overcome. Routing and security are the most challenging features to deal with considering the aspects of 
MANET’s deployment. In our paper, we have made a brief study about behavior of MANETs, its routing 
protocols and analyzed a specific attack called blackhole attack on protocols AODV and DSR. Both the 
protocols are analyzed in presence of blackhole attack with three different scenarios, in reference to the 
different types of performance parameters such as end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio and throughput. In 
case of end-to-end delay, DSR is better protocol than AODV under blackhole attack. In case of packet 
delivery ratio, AODV is shown as better protocol than DSR under blackhole attack. Finally, in case of 
throughput, DSR is shown as better protocol than AODV under blackhole attack. We can conclude as a result 
of our research and analysis done through the simulation of AODV and DSR under blackhole attack that 
protocol AODV is more vulnerable to black hole attack in comparison to protocol DSR. 
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